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Abstract 
     So far, APT (Advanced Persistent Threats) is a constant concern for information 
security. Despite that, many approaches have been used in order to detect APT 
attacks, such as change controlling, sandboxing and network traffic analysis. 
However, success of 100% couldn’t be achieved. Current studies have illustrated 
that APTs adopt many complex techniques to evade all detection types. This paper 
describes and analyzes APT problems by analyzing the most common techniques, 
tools and pathways used by attackers. In addition, it highlights the weaknesses and 
strengths of the existing security solutions that have been used since the threat was 
identified in 2006 until 2019. Furthermore, this research proposes a new framework 
that can be used to repel this threat based on APT activity with network traffic 
through packets analysis and host destination. 
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 إطار عمل الكذف عن التهديدات المدتمرة المتقدمة استناًدا إلى تحليل الحزم ووجهة المضيف
 
2دمحم نظام عمر ،*1خالد عبدالرزاق عبدالنبي المنذد  
العخاق, ذي قار, وزارة التخبية, في محافظة ذي قار لسجيخية العامة لمتخبيةا1  
كمية الحاسبات، مختبخ أبحاث اإلنتخنت، جامعة أوتارا ماليديا، قجح، ماليديا 2  
 الخالصة
. فعمى الخغم من السعمهماتأل )التيجيجات السدتسخة الستقجمة( مرجر قمق دائم APTحتى اآلن ، تعتبخ      
مثل تغييخ التحكم ، وضع الحساية ، وتحميل  APTوجهد العجيج من الطخق السدتخجمة لمكذف عن ىجهم  من
تعتسج العجيج من  APTs٪. تهضح الجراسات الحالية أن 111، إال أنيا ليدت ناجحة حخكة مخور الذبكة
من خالل  APTمذكمة  وتحمل البحثية التقشيات السعقجة لمتيخب من جسيع أنهاع االكتذاف. ترف ىحه الهرقة
تحميل التقشيات واألدوات والسدارات األكثخ شيهًعا التي يدتخجميا السياجسهن. باإلضافة إلى ذلك ، فإنو تدمط 
الزهء عمى نقاط القهة والزعف في الحمهل األمشية الحالية التي تم استخجاميا مشح أن تم تحجيج التيجيج في عام 
لك ، البحث يقتخح اطارا ججيجا يسكن ان يدتخجم لرج ىحا التيجيج . عالوة عمى ذ2112، حتى عام  2112
 من خالل تحميل الحدم والهجية السزيفة مع حخكة مخور الذبكة ,   APTباالعتساد عمى فعالية 
Introduction 
     According to the latest reports released by Kaspersky and McAfee, Advanced Persistent Threats 
(APT) is one of the most serious threats facing information security [1, 2]. Several months or even 
years usually pass before detecting this type of threat samples [3]. APT is used by the most 
sophisticated criminals on the Internet, where this type requires high experience and patience to 
stealthily access to the data of public and private companies. APT's targets are usually one of the 
                   ISSN: 0067-2904 
 
Alminshid and Omar                                    Iraqi Journal of Science, 2020, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp: 215-222 
 
216 
public or private institutions such as health care companies, financial institutions, universities and 
government agencies. 
     The APT term represents three words that are Advanced, Persistent and, Threat.  Advanced means 
that hackers who use APT have high skills, using the latest methods of infiltration and intrusion inside 
the company's system. Persistent represents a constant attack and usually implemented through a "low 
and slow" approach that depends on a period of continuous attack that may exceed months or years. 
Threat refers to the risk or danger from this type of intrusion [4]. 
     Many techniques have been used to detect APT attacks such as change controlling, sandboxing and, 
network traffic analysis. However, all these techniques are classified into two categories [5]. First, 
signature-based techniques, which are unique features already stored in the antivirus. Second, 
behavior-based techniques, which are based on behavior analysis of malware during attack. Typically, 
APT groups use zero-day malwares which are not present in the antivirus database. Therefore, the 
unknown APT threat can easily evade detection [6-8]. On the other hand, behavior-based techniques 
have three limitations: high false alarm rate, complexity [9] and inability to detect a lot of polymorphic 
threats [10]. APT cannot be identified effectively with traditional detection technologies.  
     Given these limitations, the researchers began looking for a new technique that can detect APT 
attacks. Researchers found two weaknesses that could be used in this detection process. First, all APT 
threats share the steps taken during the attack, showing certain phases of the attack before reaching the 
ultimate goal [11].  Second, the data theft cannot be completely invisible; the theft of data needs 
outbound traffic. It is a successful way to discover APT attacks [12]. Therefore, this article discusses 
the problem of APT attacks and suggests a proposed method that can be effective in the face of this 
threat. 
     This paper is organized into the following structure: The current section contains the introduction 
and background of the research. Section 2 reviews, explores, and discusses the literature to establish 
the basis of the proposed framework. Section 3 illustrates the conceptual framework. Section 4 
reviews the conclusion and future work. 
Literature Review  
     This section discusses the previous works  related to the subject of this research. The first part 
presents the history and details of the APT attacks from the perspective of the previous studies. The 
second part discusses how the previous studies analyzed the APT attack process and its life cycle. The 
third part shows how previous studies classified the APTs types and groups. The last part discusses 
and analyzes the methods and approaches that have been used to detect the APT attack.  Furthermore, 
it discusses the advantages and disadvantages  of each method. 
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) 
     APTs are electronic attacks targeting a specific destination, usually a government or private 
institution. Typically, the goal of these cyber-attacks is often to steal valuable information that exists 
in the database of these institutions [13]. APTs attack is a major problem facing the information 
security and global networks [14]. APT attacks can be bundled with shareware or other download 
software. It is not difficult for many types of the APTs to pass the firewall of the system. They use 
advanced evasion techniques to hide their malicious behaviour and evade all traditional detection 
methods [15]. APTs are more sophisticated than traditional attacks such as viruses, trojans, malware, 
worms and, backdoors. Table-1 shows the comparison between the APT attacks and traditional attacks. 
 
Table 1-Traditional attacks and APT attacks: comparison      Source:[16] 





Mostly single person 
Single-run, "smash 











Group has a high 
organization and 
advanced capabilities in 




attempts, keep slow 
and low adapt to 






Alminshid and Omar                                    Iraqi Journal of Science, 2020, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp: 215-222 
 
217 
APT attack process 
APT attacks require that everything is carefully planned and executed. However, since the term has 
been drafted in 2006 by the United States Air Force (USAF), the series of steps used by the attackers 
are similar. Previous studies identified the number of steps treated to be 4 steps [17], 5 steps [16] and 
18], 6 steps [19], 7 steps [20], and 8 steps  [21]. However, all APTs have a common characteristic of 
passing the same stages to reach their target.  Figure 1 shows the APT attack process, which can be 
summarized as mentioned below: 
1. Intelligence gathering: infiltrate the company's network  
2. Initial exploitation: install the required malware. 
3. Command and control: Malware infiltrating search for other vulnerabilities and for further 
command and control. Malicious software identifies additional vulnerabilities to be used to continue 
the attack and access to important information, passwords and email addresses. 
4. Privilege escalation: after achieving the goal, the hacker will clean the effect and leave some gaps 
to return at any time. 
5. Data exfiltration: export the data to the hacker. 
 
 
Figure 1-APT attack process.    source: [22] 
 
APT Groups and Tools  
     There are a huge number of APTs’ names [23], but most of these names fall under the same threat 
groups. Each company nominates its own names on these groups. For example, APT 29 has more than 
12 names, as shown in Table-2.  In addition, these groups often share the same tools that are used 
during the hacking process. [23] shows that the number of groups used is only 174, which have a huge 
number of names.  
     From [23], it can also be noted that the sources of these groups are limited to some countries, led by 
China: 73, Russia: 16, North Korea: 8, Iran: 17, Israel: 2, NATO: 2, Middle East: 11, Other Actors: 20, 
and Unmapped Actors: 25. The tables of [23] covered more than 174 groups and operations of APTs 
that have appeared in multiple regions around the world. Table 3 shows that the number of tools used 
does not exceed 40. The table provides a valuable contribution to researchers by providing a brief 
summary of the malware used to implement the APT phases. The detection of APT is very difficult if 
the verification process takes into account the APT issue as a whole for all steps of the attack process. 
Therefore, we can focus on the features of these tools and sources of these groups.  
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Table 2- Groups and Operations of APT29   Source: [23] 
Name  Other names Toolset / Malware Targets 
APT29 
 
1-Dukes, 2-Group 100, 3-Cozy 
Duke, 4-EuroAPT, 5-Cozy Bear, 
6-CozyCar, 7-Cozer Office 
Monkeys , 8-TEMP.Monkeys, 9- 
Minidionis, 10-SeaDuke, 11-




SeaDaddy implant developed 
in Python and compiled with 
py2exe, AdobeARM, ATI-
Agent, MiniDionis, Grizzly 




This threat actor 
targets government 
ministries and 
agencies in Europe, 
the US, Central 
Asia, East Africa, 
and the Middle 
East, associated 
with DNC attacks 
 
 
We summed up more than 174 APT groups which appeared in multiple regions around the world. The 
paper provides a valuable contribution to researchers by providing a brief summary of malicious 
software that are considered as tools for APT attacks. In addition, this research proposed a new 
framework that can be used to repel this threat based on APT activity with network traffic through 
packets analysis. Previous literature suggests that most researchers focused at one or two phases for 
the purpose of detecting APT attacks [16]. 
 
Table 3- Malware used to implement the APT phases.   Source: [23] 
 Name 1 Other names Family Comment 
1 Gh0st RAT Moudoor, Piano Gh0st, Zegost, 
  
2 Poison Ivy Darkmoon, PIVY, 
  
3 HydraQ 
9002 RAT, Troj/Agent-XAL, 
McRAT, Naid, BKDR_MDMBOT   
4 Hikit Matrix RAT, Gaolmay, 
  
5 Zxshell Sensode, 
  
6 DeputyDog Fexel, 
  
7 PlugX 
Sogu, Destory RAT, Kaba,  Korplug, 
TVT,  Thoper 
PlugX Often uses DLL side  loading 
8 BACKSPACe BARYS, Lecna 
  
9 Regin WarriorPride, Prax, QUERTY 
 
FEYES malware 
10 HttpBrowser TokenControl, 
  
11 NetTraveler RedStar, TravNet,  Netfile, 
  
12 IceFog Fucobha, 
  
13 HTran Xdoor, CTran, ONHAT (similar), 
 
Chinese Tunneling Tool 
14 Agent.BTZ SillyFDC, 
  
15 Comfoo , 
 
RSA incident, Red October 





Briba, Comfoo, Sharky RAT 
  
18 LSB , 
  
19 LStudio Emissary, Elise, 
  
20 MNKit WingD, Tran Duy Linh, 
  
21 Derusbi 
Shyape, Photo, Mivast, Sakula 
(variant), 
Derusbi Winnti , Chinese Backdoor, 
22 Wipbot Epic, Tavdig, 
  






Snake Rootkit, Cobra, 
  









Driver loaded into memory, 
P2P Backdoor 
26 WCE AceHash, 
 
Password Dumper, PTH 
27 Mimikatz Powerkatz, 
 
PTH, Password Dumper,  
DCSync, Golden/Silver 
Tickets , SkeletonKey, 
28 HDRoot HDD Rootkit, 
 
Winnti / Axiom Group 
29 OrcaRAT LeoUnica, 
 
Found with Comfoo malware 
30 Etumbot , 
 
Assocaited with Numbered 
Panda/APT12 
31 xcmd , 
 
Similar to Used in OPM, 
psexec. and Anthem breaches 
32 NjRAT , 
  
33 X-Agent Fysbis, 
 
Used by Sofacy group, Linux 
backdoor 
34 Adwind RAT 
Unrecom, Sockrat, Frutas, jFrutas, 
jBifrost RAT AlienSpy,  jSocket, Jrat, 
Adwind 
 
35 Jiripbot Flacher, 
 
Wild Neutron 
36 Quasar RAT , 
  
37 FallChill Manuscrypt , 
 
Backdoor. Used by Lazarus 
Group, Bluenoroff. 
38 Infy Infy M, 
  
39 Mtool MultiTool,  Cn Group Tool for Recon 
40 DustySky NeD Worm, 
  
 
Detecting APT Attack 
     APT detection task is not easy and needs a lot of resources. Previous literature suggests that there 
are three widely used approaches to detect APT attacks: change controlling, sandboxing and, network 
traffic analysis. 
A. Change controlling 
The main idea of this theory is to follow all changes that occur to sensitive and important aspects in 
the computer or network. If the change is illegal, you'll be alerted or acted upon. The main advantage 
of this approach is that it can detect new types of malware. There is no need to know the 
characteristics of the malware in advance. The problem is that malware can work between two of the 
resulting tests and change the state of the device before verifying legitimacy. The other drawback is 
that it does not control memory, so you should deploy additional tools for analysis. The number of 
features to be verified is very large (hundreds of thousands), leading to a significant slowdown in 
performance. 
B. Sandboxing  
     Sandboxing is a way through which a virtual environment is given under the control of malware to 
run them and then analyze their observed behavior; to determine whether the files are harmful or not. 
Consequently, the files that are not trusted are isolated. It provides robust malware prolong, but such a 
process is hard to be automated, while the manual work is expensive. 
C. Traffic Analysis 
     In order to remotely control the victim's device, attackers need to establish a command and control 
channel. It is responsible for sending commands and transferring data. Most malware (e.g. Gh0st, PC 
Share, Poison Ivy and Remote Access Tool (RAT)) often use inbound and outbound traffic. Traffic 
analysis is the oldest and most widely used method. In this technique, the analysts of the outbound 
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traffic and a sequence of features unique to the APT attack are used to detect the attack. In this case, 
regardless of how the machine was infected (even if the APT attack is new), the attack can be detected. 
However, it is too hard to analyze traffic in a large network. Detecting APT malware infections in a 
large network is another challenging problem [24]. 
     To hide the intrusion, sometimes the hacker takes one of the computers as a starting point to attack 
the company's other internal computers (stepping stones) [25, 26]. To reduce the damage caused by 
APTs attack, the company needs to know APT-infected computers as quickly as possible. To solve 
this problem, there is a need to involve one of the methods of the stepping stone approach to detect the 
threat as quickly as possible.  
     In a published work [12], the authors noted that monitoring and analyzing network traffic leads to 
the detection of APT activities. They analyzed various APT campaigns such as Enfal, Taidoor, 
Sykipot, and IXESHE, which have been used to launch targeted attacks. These malicious programs 
create a connection to the command and control server using known protocols such as HTTP and are 
typically configured through three ports (443, 80, and 8080). Monitoring the size and timing of 
network traffic is another aspect to detect APT attacks. 
     In other investigations [27, 28], the experimental process included backdoor samples which are 
commonly used in APT activities. The results of these studies agreed with the studies mentioned 
above in that monitoring packets is an effective way to detect APT attacks. The experiment explained 
that the proposed method is very fast compared with other antivirus systems and IDS. Furthermore, 
most of the malware attacks detected by the proposed method were not detected by the previous 
antivirus systems or IDS.  
Proposed framework 
     Previous studies have shown, as previously mentioned in the Introduction and Literature Review 
sections, that APT attacks have  two weaknesses through which they can be detected. First, attackers 
need to establish a command and control channel. The data theft cannot be completely invisible; the 
theft of data needs outbound traffic. Second, all APT threats need to establish a command and control 
channel. Moreover, the researchers also noted that monitoring and analyzing network traffic leads to 
the detection of APT activities. Therefore, in our research, we relied on the traffic analysis as the best 
way to detect APT threats.  
     However, the problem that needs to be solved is the sheer amount of traffic that needs to be 
analysed. We solved this problem by using Destination Host Filter unit and a blacklist of host 
destinations based on the fact, as has been previously noted in Table 2, that the sources of these groups 
are limited to some countries. 
     The proposed framework of this paper is based on a set of logical points as described below.  
1. All previous studies related to APT attacks indicated that the attacker needs to communicate with 
the victim several times; the first time is when the APT penetrates the system and then repeats the 
connection upon the transfer of information from the victim to the attacker. Communication with 
command and control happens often multiple times; therefore monitoring packets with huge payloads, 
which are sent to the same destination IP address, will help to identify any suspicious behavior. 
2. When the type of the attack uses outgoing flow only, such as the APTs backdoors that 
make only outbound connections [29], there is no incoming flow in this scenario. We need only to 
monitor the outgoing repeated packets, which are headed to the same destination. Our proposed 
framework adopted the technique of ‘Packets Detection System‘ based on a previous work [28]. 
Experiments have shown that the proposed method is very fast compared to other antivirus systems 
and IDs. In addition, this technique can detect zero-day and encrypted malware. 
3. However, it is not easy to monitor the huge number of outgoing packets. To solve this problem, we 
can reduce the huge number of packets that are monitored by focusing on the limited number of 
suspicious hosts [30]. This method is effective even for encrypted connections because the load is not 
checked. In addition, the method is expandable as most analyzes can be implemented in parallel. 
Figure 2 shows the proposed framework. Our proposed framework adopted this technique as a 
‘Destination Host Filter unit’. 




Figure 2-The proposed framework of APT Detection Based on Packets Analysis and Host Destination. 
 
     The proposed framework includes sending the flow to the Destination Host Filter unit, which 
matches the destination traffic host with the blacklist of stored hosts.  If it is matched, the flow will 
convert to Packets Detection System which will issue the final decision, either to send it to the external 
network or to block transmission if the packets are not clean. This technique will solve the problem of 
monitoring the huge number of outgoing packets by focusing on a limited number of suspicious hosts. 
Conclusion  
     The APT attack is a major problem facing information security and global networks. It is not 
difficult for many types of the APTs to pass the firewall of the system. APTs are more sophisticated 
than traditional attacks, as they use advanced evasion techniques to hide their malicious behaviour and 
evade all traditional detection methods. This paper describes and analyzes the APT problem by 
analyzing the most common techniques, tools and pathways used by attackers. Furthermore, the paper 
highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the existing security solutions that have been used since the 
threat was identified in 2006 until 2019. The paper summarized more than 174 groups and operations 
of APTs that have appeared in multiple regions around the world. This research also provided a 
valuable contribution to researchers by providing a brief summary of the malware used to implement 
the APT phases. In addition, this research proposed a new framework that can be used to repel this 
threat based on APT activity with network traffic through packets analysis.  
 
References 
1. Zimba, A., Chen, H. and Wang, Z. 2019. Bayesian network based weighted APT attack paths 
modeling in cloud computing. Future Generation Computer Systems, 2019. 
2. Han, W. 2019. MalInsight: A systematic profiling based malware detection framework. Journal of 
Network and Computer Applications, 125: p. 236-250. 
3. Ugarte-Pedrero, X., Graziano, M. and Balzarotti, D. 2019. A Close Look at a Daily Dataset of 
Malware Samples. ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (TOPS), 22(1): p. 6. 
4. Jasek, R., Kolarik, M. and Vymola, T. 2013. APT detection system using honeypots. in 
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Applied Informatics and Communications 
(AIC'13), WSEAS Press. 
5. Sonawane, S., Prasad, G. and Pardeshi, S. 2012. A survey on intrusion detection techniques. 
World Journal of Science and Technology, 2(3). 
6. Balzarotti, D. 2010. Efficient detection of split personalities in malware. in Network and 
Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). 
7. Radmand, A. 2009. A ghost in software, [cited 2013 sep, 21]; Course]. Available from: 
http://cs.columbusstate.edu/cae-ia/StudentPapers/radmand.azadeh.pdf. 
Alminshid and Omar                                    Iraqi Journal of Science, 2020, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp: 215-222 
 
222 
8. Hamed, T., Ernst, J.B. and Kremer, S.C. 2018. A Survey and Taxonomy on Data and Pre-
processing Techniques of Intrusion Detection Systems, in Computer and Network Security 
Essentials. 2018, Springer. p. 113-134. 
9. Idika, N. and A.P. Mathur, A.P. 2007. A survey of malware detection techniques. Purdue 
University, p. 48. 
10. Maarof, M.A. and Osman, A.H. 2012. Malware Detection Based on Hybrid Signature Behaviour 
Application Programming Interface Call Graph. American Journal of Applied Sciences, 9. 
11. Slot, T. and Kargl, F. 2015. Detection of apt malware through external and internal network 
traffic correlation. 2015, Master Thesis, University of Twente March. 
12. Villeneuve, N. and Bennett, J. 2012. Detecting apt activity with network traffic analysis. Trend 
Micro Incorporated Research Paper, p. 1-13. 
13. Sharma, P.K. 2017. DFA-AD: adistributed framework architecture for the detection of advanced 
persistent threats. Cluster Computing, 20(1):  p. 597-609. 
14. Chakkaravarthy, S.S., Vaidehi, V. and Rajesh, P. 2018. Hybrid Analysis Technique to detect 
Advanced Persistent Threats. International Journal of Intelligent Information Technologies 
(IJIIT), 14(2): p. 59-76. 
15. Haq, T., Zhai, J. and Pidathala, V.K. 2017. Advanced persistent threat (APT) detection center. 
2017, Google Patents. 
16. Alshamrani, A. 2019. A Survey on Advanced Persistent Threats: Techniques, Solutions, 
Challenges, and Research Opportunities. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials. 
17. Lim, Y. 2013. Review on the Cyber Attack by Advanced Persistent Threat. The Korean 
Association for Terrorism Studies, 2013. 6(2): p. 158-178. 
18. Tankard, C. 2011. Advanced persistent threats and how to monitor and deter them. Network 
security, 2011. 2011(8): p. 16-19. 
19. Chen, P., Desmet, L. and Huygens, C. 2014. A study on advanced persistent threats. in IFIP 
International Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security, Springer. 
20. McWhorter, D. 2013. Mandiant Exposes APT1—One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units & 
Releases 3,000 Indicators. Mandiant, February, 18. 
21. De Vries, J. 2012. Towards a roadmap for development of intelligent data analysis based cyber 
attack detection systems. 
22. Burazer, R. 2015. CYBERSECURITY: ISSUES AND ISACA’S RESPONSE, 6/1/2019]; 
Available from: https://csa-cee-summit.eu/archive/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Renato-
Burazer.pdf. 
23. Stirparo, P. 2019. APT Groups and Operations, 02-07-2019]; Available from: 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/u/1/d/1H9_xaxQHpWaa4O_Son4Gx0YOIzlcBWMsdvePF
X68EKU/pubhtml?cv=1. 
24. Zhao, G. 2015. Detecting APT malware infections based on malicious DNS and traffic analysis. 
IEEE access, 3: p. 1132-1142. 
25. Alperovitch, D. 2011.  Revealed: operation shady RAT. Vol. 3. 2011: McAfee. 
26. Liu, S.T., Y.M. Chen, Y.M. and H.C. 2012. Hung. N-victims: An approach to determine n-victims 
for apt investigations. in International Workshop on Information Security Applications. Springer. 
27. Alminshid, K. and M.N. Omar, M.N. 2013. Detecting backdoor using stepping stone detection 
approach. in Second International Conference on Informatics & Applications (ICIA). 2013. IEEE. 
28. Al-Minshid, K.A.A. 2014. Backdoor attack detection based on stepping stone detection approach, 
Universiti Utara Malaysia. 
29. Welch, V. 2012. Security at the Cyber Border: Exploring Cybersecurity for International Research 
Network Connections. 
30. Marchetti, M. 2016. Analysis of high volumes of network traffic for advanced persistent threat 
detection. Computer Networks, 109: p. 127-141. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
View publication stats
